AUKUS and the Indian Ocean: Why getting nuclear stewardship right, matters now
As the region becomes more nuclear, it must also become more secure.
Jasmin Diab
Senior Research Adviser: Nuclear Technologies,
Perth USAsia Centre
19 May 2026
Join the Perth USAsia Centre in the lead‑up to the 2026 Indian Ocean Defence and Security (IODS) Conference for a new op‑ed series, Broadening Australia’s strategic focus in an Indian Ocean century. This series examines Australia’s shifting security environment and why Australia cannot afford to under‑prioritise the Indian Ocean. With Western Australia at the heart of this engagement, our experts will explore why expanding our strategic focus is a necessity for our nation’s future.
In the third article in this series, Jasmin Diab emphasises Australia’s potential leadership role in regional nuclear security frameworks.
Key takeaways
Often described as Australia’s Indian Ocean capital, Western Australia has dived into the deep end of geopolitics as the developments to host, maintain and, in time, base, nuclear powered submarines accelerate. As this occurs, the Indo-Pacific is undergoing profound transformation; it is becoming more nuclear.
Across the region, nations are investing heavily in nuclear technologies. China and India are expanding their civil nuclear power programs with ambitious energy generation targets. South Korea and Japan continue to invest in nuclear energy capabilities, while Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have plans to embark on civilian nuclear power programs. However, this is not just a story on power generation for energy security or military modernisation, this is an era where civil and military nuclear domains are converging across shared maritime spaces.
[T]his is an era where civil and military nuclear domains are converging across shared maritime spaces.
With this comes increased complexity, and with complexity comes risk. The nuclear industry is heavily reliant on robust global governance and regulation. If not managed properly, gaps can form, increasing vulnerability to safety and/or security incidents, regulatory compliance failures, and heightened proliferation concerns. This is especially concerning in a region where governance frameworks are uneven and domestic security threats vary significantly.
These developments are far from abstract. The Indian Ocean is one of the world’s most vital strategic arteries. We are beholden to its capacity to carry energy supplies and trade flows, and to enable naval traffic to transit between continents. Western Australia sits at the eastern edge of this ocean, acting as the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As AUKUS activities expand, Western Australia will be a central node of this evolving security architecture.
That brings opportunities. But with this opportunity comes great responsibility.
The risks associated with nuclear technologies must be delivered locally, resourced and coordinated nationally, and, in the eyes of the nuclear industry, underpinned by credible international oversight. It is in this context that the AUKUS partnership must be understood – not just as a defence agreement, but a strategic inflection point for nuclear governance in the Indo-Pacific. To date, much of the public debate has focused on the capabilities of nuclear-powered submarines and their contribution to supporting Australia’s national security posture. This argument is important, but incomplete. The deeper significance lies in Australia’s potential to shape and manage how nuclear technologies are regulated and secured across the region.
The deeper significance lies in Australia’s potential to shape and manage how nuclear technologies are regulated and secured across the region.
If implemented effectively, AUKUS could act as a catalyst for stronger nuclear security frameworks in three ways.
First, it can help raise nuclear security regulatory standards. Australia’s development of nuclear stewardship ecosystems will draw on the highest international benchmarks. If implemented transparently, this could set a regional example, particularly for states new to nuclear technologies, where workforce and governance frameworks are still evolving.
Second, AUKUS can strengthen incident prevention and response. The increased movement of nuclear-powered vessels through Indo-Pacific waters heightens the need for coordinated safety and security protocols. Shared approaches to emergency response, environmental monitoring, and accident mitigation will be essential. Australia, through AUKUS, is well placed to help develop and embed these mechanisms across the Indian Ocean region.
Third, and perhaps the most important, AUKUS has the potential to reduce strategic ambiguity around nuclear technologies. One of the key challenges in the region is the blurring of lines between nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons programs. By maintaining strong non-proliferation commitments and clearly reinforcing its non-nuclear weapons status, Australia’s role in the AUKUS program could contribute to greater transparency and trust in an otherwise uncertain environment.
But this outcome is not guaranteed. If handled poorly, AUKUS risks exacerbating the very insecurities it seeks to address. A lack of transparency could fuel regional suspicion. Weak or underdeveloped regulatory frameworks could undermine confidence in Australia’s ability to rapidly grow and manage nuclear technologies safely and securely. Closer to home, failure by Canberra to fully understand the practical realities of the local environment and engage meaningfully with Western Australian communities’ risks undermining the social licence needed to sustain such a significant undertaking. The stakes, therefore, are not just strategic, they are also practical and immediate. Getting this right requires more than technical capability, it demands political commitment, institutional rigour, and public trust.
If handled poorly, AUKUS risks exacerbating the very insecurities it seeks to address.
So, what does ‘getting it right’ look like? Firstly, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator (ANNPSR), as the independent regulator, must maintain its independence from the Australian Submarine Agency and Royal Australian Navy. Its credibility will depend on transparency and accountability. Second, Canberra must more actively engage with Indian Ocean partners on nuclear matters, not just traditional allies. Building confidence through sustained dialogue and cooperation will be essential. Third, investment is required in uplifting nuclear security, environmental protection, and emergency response capabilities, particularly in Western Australia. Critically, the Australian public must be brought along. Openness, not opacity, will determine whether AUKUS is seen as a national asset or strategic failure.
The Indo-Pacific’s nuclear future is not a distant prospect; it is unfolding now. From the vantage point of Western Australia, the AUKUS submarine program is more than a defence initiative; it is a test of whether Australia can emerge as a responsible and trusted nuclear steward in an increasingly complex strategic environment. If we succeed, the benefits will extend well beyond deterrence. Australia will help shape the rules, norms, and practices that govern nuclear technologies across the Indo-Pacific. If we get it wrong, the consequences – strategic, environmental, and political – will be felt just as widely. The task now is to ensure that as the region becomes more nuclear, it also becomes more secure.
Related insights
Views on defence and security from Australia’s Indian Ocean capital
Australia’s national security is evolving; energy, critical minerals, supply chains, digital infrastructure, and diplomacy are increasingly central to Australia’s strategic resilience. Simultaneously, WA is emerging as Australia’s strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean, and a central player in terms of regional security, beyond the narrow military focus of AUKUS.
Trading around the Cape: Australian security and the southwestern Indian Ocean
As the world moves into an era of increased strategic uncertainty, Australia can no longer assume that the northern Indian Ocean’s sea lanes will remain secure. This makes deeper engagement with the strategic landscape of the southwest Indian Ocean increasingly important – particularly as instability and maritime disruptions in the Middle East make the Cape of Good Hope route a viable alternative for trade between Europe and Asia.
The Indian Ocean is no longer secondary
The Iran war is again exposing a reality Australia has long overlooked: the Indian Ocean sits at the centre of the nation’s economic and strategic security.
Assumptions, not reality: Australia’s Indian Ocean challenge
Hormuz is not the end of the story. It is the beginning. Australia can no longer afford to assume stability in the Indian Ocean. And, with the right vision, Western Australia has the potential to become the nation’s strategic gateway to the region.
