

INDO-PACIFIC

INSIGHT SERIES



The ADF and the Indo-Pacific Operating Environment

The Indo-Pacific promises a new geography for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). As Australia's conception of its region expands westwards to include the Indian Ocean Rim, the ADF faces a new and markedly different operating environment. The extension of sea lines of communication linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the emergence of 'urban littoral zones' pose questions regarding access and the conduct of military operations. Australian defence planners need to develop new approaches to the structure and deployment of the ADF, which reflect the distinctive physical, human and technological geographies of the new Indo-Pacific region.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The Indo-Pacific concept promises a 'new geography' for the operations of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- Driven by the rise of regional powers, alongside a re-emergence of geopolitical rivalries, Australia's concept of 'the region' has in recent years expanded westwards to include countries on the Indian Ocean Rim.
- As reflected in recent Defence White Papers, this has seen the 'Indo-Pacific' replace the 'Asia-Pacific' as a conceptual map of Australia's region. The Indo-Pacific poses a new and unique operating environment for the ADF.
- A key development is the westward extension of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Another is the emergence of 'urban littoral zones', where people, industries and defence assets are densely concentrated along coastlines.
- The distinctive physical, human and now 'technological' geographies of the Indo-Pacific necessitate a reappraisal of the structure and deployment of the ADF.
- In particular, attention should be paid to the appropriate balance between joint capabilities of - land, sea and air power to project forces into the region.



THE INDO-PACIFIC AS AN OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

For good reasons the focus of the ADF in recent decades has been on supporting operations in the Middle East. Sustained military operations on land, at sea and in the air across the region were a major priority in the post-September 11 era. While these operations were a high priority in terms of Australia's strategic posture they remain operational responses to issues of broad security concerns as opposed to the defence of Australia's primary strategic interests.

While military operations have been focused on far off distant wars of political choice, the nature of the geostrategic environment closer to home in the Indo-Pacific has changed considerably. This transformation has led to a changing character of risk in the region that is a product of increased wealth and power and strategic competition within the region. Some of the most evident changes in this period have been increasing regional trade and the rise of communications technology, which have driven intra-regional and global connectivity. This has occurred alongside the re-rise of nationalism which has become a significant factor in regional geopolitics. At the heart of many of these changes is geography. This new 'integrated Asia', as Nick Bisley has described it, is an area of increasing instability, "where cooperation among the great powers will be much harder to achieve" resulting in a strategic environment where "Australia's interests will be much harder to achieve."¹

The concept of the Indo-Pacific is based on geography. The trajectory in defence planning and strategy around geography has, however, been rather vexed in recent decades. In the post-Cold War era we saw the supposed 'unipolar moment' corresponding with the re-rise of globalisation.² The rise of security concerns around non-state actors and transnational threats as well as the accelerated progress of information technology during this period saw many analysts and strategic commentators argue that geography had become less significant.³

While strategic interests were seen by many to have grown more distributed, for most countries geography remained a key strategic determinant. A more globalised world did not remove the fact that immediate geographic regions are predominantly where a state's territory, population and strategic interests are concentrated. In terms of defence planning and the conduct of military operations geographic factors remained significant. As Stephan Fruehling has argued, while "geographic distance does not necessarily make strategic interests less important, it does reduce the extent to which a country can do something about them and hence the level at which they can manage the risks that emerge".⁴

The key exception in the post-Cold War era was the sole global super power – the United States. The Clinton administration in the USA eschewed geographical determinants as a major planning principle, instead focusing on global risks and being guided by events and crisis. By 2006 US defence planning was viewed in terms of traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic risks. Geography had all but disappeared from US defence planning.⁵ In Australia the key determinates of geography remained, but the benign Asian strategic environment of the time and the onset of conflicts in the Middle East from 1989 onward led to the globalisation of the US-Australian alliance and subsequently ADF military operations.

Globalisation and interconnectivity seemed to expand exponentially during the unipolar era. However at the same time the dynamics of global power were changing and by the late 1990s Asia was undergoing a resurgence of geopolitics. Most significantly economic, and thus strategic power, was moving from the European and North American spheres to the Indo-Pacific. What was occurring was what Robert Kaplan has called the 'revenge of geography' as the return of great power politics emerged with more distributed and multilateral power structures⁶. This was evidenced through the rise of much stronger



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regional powers such as Iran, China and India and a more assertive Russia. From the early 2000s many of these states started to contest regional power dynamics and demonstrated a resolve to use force, or the threatened use of force, to exert their influence and reshape regional orders.

In response to the newly evolving Asian strategic order the 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP) refocused Australian strategic guidance on the Asia-Pacific region.⁷ By the DWP of 2013, this geographical refocusing had evolved from an Asia-Pacific to an Indo-Pacific geographical concept.⁸ This was justified as a 'logical extension' of the Asia-Pacific concept that "adjusts Australia's priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends."

Around the same time, geography made a considered comeback in US defence-planning through the 2012 strategic guidance document *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*.⁹ Released outside the normal cycle of US strategic policy documents, and not long after President Barack Obama's 2011 announcement in the Australian parliament of the 'Pivot', this document focused US defence planning on two regions: the Asia-Pacific (particularly in response to China's rise) and the Middle East.¹⁰

In *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership* Europe was discussed in the context of lower priority areas such as Africa and Latin America. This was reaffirmed in the 2014 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in which the Asia-Pacific region not only ranked first in terms of the document's order of analysis for global security, it also took up twice as much space in the strategic environment section of the document compared to the Middle East¹¹. Europe, Africa and the Western Hemisphere were summed up in only one paragraph each. In the section discussing the US strategy to 'Build Security Globally', again the Asia-Pacific region was front and centre with the QDR declaring that "US interests remain

inextricably linked to the peace and security of the Asia Pacific region"¹².

On 18 December 2017 the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS)¹³. While proclaiming the doctrine of "America First" this document provided continuity in terms of its focus geographical and the prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific region over the Middle East, Europe and other areas. The key changes for this document were the explicit calling out China and Russia as strategic competitors who are challenging US interests. In addition the document notes the importance of the cyber and space as new domains for competition, highlighting the importance of technological driven 'geography' as well as traditional geopolitics and regional based power dynamics. Overall Trump's NSS makes it clear that his administration considers the Indo-Pacific as the United States' primary area of strategic importance.

The next major document from the Trump Administration's was the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Following the lead of the NSS it also embraced the adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategic concept for the region. In line with the previous QDR's the document emphasises the increasing 'complex global security environment' and the challenge to the US led order. In terms of geographic priorities, beyond the protection of the home land, the document postures the US to deter adversaries and maintain a military advantage in key regions focused on the 'Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere.'¹⁴ The document also highlights the behaviour of key global players singling out China as a 'strategic competitor', Russia for its violation of the borders of near neighbours as well as North Korea's 'outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric'. One of the key questions though is how much this declared US defence strategy stacks up in the face of a US President who has openly questioned US global leadership, the US led rules based international order and US allies.



AUSTRALIA'S NEW INDO-PACIFIC GEOGRAPHY

The Indo-Pacific is still emerging as a system. Most significantly “given its diversity and broad sweep, [the Indo-Pacific] security architecture is, unsurprisingly, a series of sub-regions and arrangements rather than a unitary whole.”¹⁵ The most significant of these subregions for Australia are Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. As the Defence White Paper defines the security dimensions of the Indo-Pacific:


“Our nearer region, which encompasses Australia’s borders and offshore territories, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island Countries and maritime South East Asia, is of most immediate importance for Australia’s security”¹⁶

Throughout its strategic history these regions have been the locus of where Australian interests, geography, security concerns and power have intersected. Since Federation these subregions have been the centre point of Australia's areas of directly military interest, at times otherwise known as the ADF's 'primary operating environment.'¹⁷

For militaries, geography has always been the fundamental building block of strategy and operations.¹⁸ The Indo-Pacific maintains a mix of maritime and continental characteristics, while Australia's two key subregions of the South Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia are fundamentally archipelagic in nature. Within Australia's primary Indo-Pacific subregions, three physical domains dominate: the Pacific

and Indian oceans, the archipelagic littorals zone, and the hinterlands.

In terms of human geography much has changed in this region since the mid twentieth century. The end of the Second World War saw the collapse of empires and the emergence of independent Asian and Pacific states; a process that continued through to the 1970s. In more recent years rising populations, economic growth, wealth and affluence have seen the character of these nations change, especially with the emergence of strong capitalist economies. This affluence has seen the rise of urban centres and the increasing importance of the maritime superhighways that support this geographic system. Within this geography three dimensions are vital: the coastal areas, urban cities, and the emergence of vast peri-urban areas. These geographic dimensions in the South Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia are all easily accessible from the littoral zone.



Added to the physical and human dimensions of geography are the effects of globalisation and the technological revolution. What has emerged from these global trends are three areas of technical geography: traditional



communications such as radio and television; the new dimension of global connectivity through the internet; and the more recent rise of surveillance technology evidenced by the mass expansion of low cost real-time video surveillance, GPS tracking, infrared systems, persistent surveillance and networked intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.

These are all exceptionally important considerations for Australian strategic policy and in particular for the ADF. When assessing the Indo-Pacific strategic environment as a military geographic system geography has become three dimensional across the domains of physical, human and now technological geography. It is critical therefore for Australian strategic policy officials and the ADF to more deeply consider and explore how military operations influence, shape and dominate each of these strategic geographies. Australia's strategy must focus on its two key subregions. Each of these regions provides different challenges and considerations for the use of Australian military force and hold different strategic challenges for Australia.

In the South Pacific Australia is the dominant regional power. The security of the South Pacific has remained a key strategic objective for Australia, second only to the direct security of Australia itself.¹⁹ The one and only time that a major power lodged in this area (1942), Australia, alongside the United States and New Zealand fought a long, bloody and protracted maritime campaign that required a total war effort from the nation. While this remains a remote possibility, the security and prosperity of this region remains paramount as evidenced by the multiple ADF operations and deployments in this area, especially from 1987 onwards.

In terms of the physical geography, this is a highly intensive littoral region. Like the rest of the Indo-Pacific the trends in this region are for increased, although often imbalanced, prosperity and urbanisation. However smaller populations, limited natural resources and a lower concentration of

economic power in this region have meant that the pace of change has been much more fragmented. Urban planning remains largely neglected, critical infrastructure is missing leading to economic problems, as well as poor social and health outcomes for large sections of the population. Despite these challenges the interconnectivity of the modern world is also firmly implanted in these key South Pacific countries with mobile phone technology, improved road and sea transport links bringing rural hinterlands and urban areas closer - driving much of the economic activity.²⁰

Across the South Pacific, with the exception of Samoa, urban population growth is outstripping national growth. For example, the largest concentration of urbanisation in the Solomon Islands is experiencing 4.4% growth – twice the rate of population growth. In PNG the urban population is expected to double by 2030, reaching 2 million.²¹ Key centres such as Honiara and Port Moresby are both large coastal urban cities of rapid growth. They may well lack the infrastructure and sophisticated development of many modern mega cities found elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, however they still present complex challenges.²² A key characteristic of these cities are large swathes of sprawling shanty towns that can be thought of as city-villages or extended peri-urban areas rather than megacities. However, in these spaces population density exceeds that of megacities such as Hong Kong or Singapore.

As such, the key urban centres of the South Pacific present policy officials and military planners with a multifaceted and challenging operating environment for military operations.

Australia's other critical subregion of the Indo-Pacific, maritime Southeast Asia also possesses a large littoral population. In this subregion, 65% of people live within 50 kilometres of the coast, while 75% of cities are



in low-lying coastal areas. In 2010 there were some 245 million people in Southeast Asia living in urbanised areas. In 1950 urbanised areas represented only some 15.4 percent of the population. By 2025 they will account for approximately 50% of the total population of the region.²³ This trend towards urbanisation is occurring more broadly with 45.5 per cent of the population across the Asia-Pacific region in urban areas.

Mega cities and their associated metropolitan areas account for 29 per cent of Asia's population.

These areas are the hub for economic efficiency 'contributing 80 per cent of the regions gross domestic product.'²⁴ The vast majority of them also exist in littoral areas. Our near neighbour Indonesia has the longest coastline of any country in the world with the majority of populations close to the sea. Slightly further north 70% of Malaysia's population is urban, with cities clustering on the coast of the Malayan peninsular.²⁵

This rapid urban-littoral growth is also a cause for concern. Rapid growth means that urban areas often suffer from lagging infrastructure needs. This means they can be hubs of poverty and social inequality that can lead to unrest causing spiralling security issues. There is also growing concern about the environmental sustainability of this rapid, and often unregulated, growth. For example these Indo-Pacific littoral based urban centres are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters highlighted by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This event caused the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant and destroyed 150,000 Japanese homes. This Tsunami resulted in another 120,000 buildings being destroyed, 278,000 were half-destroyed and 726,000 were partially destroyed, with 'the direct financial damage from the disaster is estimated to be about \$199 billion [US] dollars' and the 'total economic cost' of up to \$235B.²⁶

More recently parts of Sulawesi Is in Indonesia was devastated by a Tsunami on 28 September 2018 killing more than 1,900 people, displaced 70,000 with up to 5,000 more still missing. Many scientific experts are predicting an increasing in natural disasters due to climate change. These events are having a greater impact as "people, infrastructure, and wealth are being concentrated into increasingly exposed urban centers in the most hazardous parts of the planet."²⁷ Such events will lead to increased use of military forces for humanitarian assistance and disaster (HADR) missions and could create the context for the deterioration of security conditions and rising level of conflict, especially from competition over natural resources. In terms of military operations, scale of the challenge rises exponentially with the increased complexity driven by large population masses clustered in increasingly in littoral spaces.

The return of geopolitics has occurred concurrently with the continued acceleration of a global technological revolution, highlighted by the interconnected nature of our digital world. This communications based revolution has been accompanied by a continued development of what has been termed an Information-Technology Revolution in Military Affairs (IT-RMA) that has driven advances in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), weapons ranges, military lethality and precision guided munitions.²⁸ This process has resulted in a re-rise of Anti-Access / Area-Denial (A2AD) capabilities in a return to the long running contest in military affairs between offensive and defensive fire power.²⁹

These are critical factors when assessing the Indo-Pacific, a vast, diverse and complex region that stretches from 'Hollywood to Bollywood'.³⁰ On this vast Indo-Pacific stage sits three key consequences of this increased locus of economic and strategic power in the region: rapid urbanisation, the increased significance of littoral spaces and the growth of connectivity of these areas. Across the Indo-Pacific rapid urbanisation has been a major consequence of population growth



and economic modernisation. This process has elevated millions of people out of poverty and created expanding and prosperous middle classes across the region.

One of the key consequences of this development has been the increased significance of the littoral zones. The littorals are the area in which most of these new or expanded urban areas reside. It is within this space that the majority of the flows of both people and trade exist. 70% of the world's population and virtually all centres of international trade are in littoral regions. Among the 63 most populated global urban areas (with five million or more inhabitants), 72% are located on or near the coast, with two-thirds in Asia.³¹ In the Indo-Pacific area over three-quarters of the population live within 200kms of the coast. 80% of cities, most of the vital infrastructure and the key hubs of trade, industry and military power are found within this zone.³²

By 2025 it is estimated that 75% of humanity will live in coastal areas. Nowhere is this phenomenon more concentrated than in the Indo-Pacific.

As a result of these global trends these littoral areas are also globalised and technologically enhanced. In Australia, where 8 out of 10 people live within 50kms of the coast, there are 70 million devices that can connect to the Internet in a population of only

25 million. This is expanding exponentially with Telsyte “estimating that the average Australian home will have 30.7 connected devices by the year 2021, which would be an overall growth of 124% in just four years.”³³ Throughout the region Indo-Pacific, access to satellites is rapidly increasing and mobile technology is proliferating. This access to digital- and space-based technology means that this communications technology is often expanding independent of the once critical land-based infrastructure that in many regards has simply been bypassed.

With continental land borders in the Indo-Pacific largely set, although not often settled, it is in the maritime domain that the pushes and pulls of this new strategic order have been played out in recent years. In this region it is amongst the global passages of trade that power converges and more often in recent years collides. This has been critically apparent in terms of littoral territory including access to and control of exclusive economic zones (EEZ), small islands (both natural and man-made), and rocky outcrops – many of which are submerged at high tide. It is the footprints of littoral landforms and maritime waterways that will, as Michael Wesley has recently pointed out, will “set the logic of Asia's strategic dynamics and beyond it the world's.”³⁴



MILITARY POWER IN AN INDO-PACIFIC GEOGRAPHY

What does this mean for the way militaries should be structured and deployed? Because, as the great maritime theorist Julian Corbett pointed out, man lives upon the land and not the sea, therefore controlling the heavily populated littoral zone is critically important. Throughout history it is in this zone that most maritime conflicts and thus naval engagements have occurred. As Geoffrey Till has noted, because of this in many respects the movement of modern maritime operations has gone from deploying power at sea to deploying power from the sea. More recently, Al Palazzo and Chris Smith have observed that “the joint effect that land, naval and air forces exert upon people is therefore the essential means....[and as such]...the binding connection between land, naval and air forces must be their joint capacity to affect events on land.”³⁵

Throughout the ADF's primary operating environment most of the strategic infrastructure and population centres are actually located within 25 kilometres of the coast; thus the littoral regions and access

to them is critical for any military operation across the spectrum of conflict. This also means that access and anti-access is critically important in the maritime context, and that all three military services have an important role to play in this fundamentally joint operating environment.

In terms of access within these littoral regions only 5% of the coastline is man-made and can easily be used by ships and craft to unload. 25% of beaches can take landing craft, 75% of coastlines are accessible by hovercraft and small boats can access 95%.³⁶ Accordingly, as the importance of both the Indo-Pacific region and the sub regions of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia grows so will the requirement for the ADF to conduct operations in these regions. This, of course, is not limited to Australia's strategic geography. The growth of global economic and strategic power in the Indo-Pacific has led to extensive regional military modernisation, much of it focused on maritime capabilities as Australia's neighbours also look to expand their activities in the littoral zone.




THE ROLE OF LAND POWER IN INDO-PACIFIC URBAN LITTORAL ZONES

Operations in the Indo-Pacific urban-littoral operating environment are thus highly dependent on maritime capabilities. In addition, land forces are highly reliant on sealift and amphibious warfare capabilities; especially to provide access to close in urban centres, peri-urban terrain and hinterlands via the sea and air. For land forces to operate in this environment across the full spectrum of conflict they need to think, evolve and develop doctrine that fits more in line with marine corps-style operating concepts than continental land army doctrines.

These include the role of maritime based land forces in maritime security operations; in sea based military exercises and diplomacy; littoral Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations; non-combatant evacuation operations; regional security missions as well as traditional amphibious raids, withdrawals and assaults. In order to achieve these missions land forces must make use of the littoral and maritime environments as manoeuvre spaces; they must access and contribute to maritime domain awareness and undertake deep consideration of logistical and other challenges in maintaining a land force at sea and across the shore.

Land forces must think in terms of threats and operations in the littoral zone.



Note: Figure adapted from Army Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, n.d.), 5, available at https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalogs-ws/view/100.ATSC/CE5F5937-49EC-44EF-83F3-FC25CB0CB942-1274110898250/aledc_ref/army_vision_2010.pdf.



At the lower end of the conflict spectrum are HADR operations such as the recent Operation Fiji Assist, where an ADF joint task force delivered humanitarian and disaster relief supplies in the wake of category 5 tropical cyclone Winston. This operation demonstrated the importance of the new, much more capable, although still evolving joint amphibious warfare capability in the ADF. As the major net security provider in the South Pacific, Australia has a critical role to play in this region. Here the Australian Army and the ADF need to maintain their focus on high probability, lower level operations where access through the littorals to both urban centres and island outposts will be critical.

When operating in these urbanised littoral environments militaries, face a new set of operational requirements. As David Kilcullen has argued: "irregular operations that are the historical norm...[could well require]... an advanced force...to seize a port, harbor, or airfield as a sea or air point of entry for follow on forces, perhaps against light irregular opposition, [to] then put it back into service [the port or airfield] as a base of operations. In fact, seizing a lodgement area large enough to cover both a seaport and airfield will probably be a prerequisite for virtually any long term operations in a littoral environment."³⁷

As we continue up the spectrum of conflict to counterinsurgency activities, we see the critical importance of the role of land power in coalition environments. This is particularly salient in Southeast Asia, where Australia will need to work with the United States and partners in Southeast Asia provide maritime security and to operate in the littoral zones and provide security and conduct operations in and from urbanised coastal areas.

When emerging from the middle to the higher end of the conflict spectrum it is essential that land forces play a central role in providing a joint area denial capability; thus the development of a new generation of ground based air defence capabilities and a long range land based missile capability as identified in the 2016 DWP will be essential for the future operations of the Australian Army.³⁸ The role of land forces in major theatre war in areas dominated by the geography of littoral landforms should not be underestimated. As a recent Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report noted, distributed amphibious forces can play critical roles to "dilute enemy attacks, gain access to contested areas and deny it to the enemy."³⁹

The role of land power is particularly significant in an era of three dimensional geography with rapid advances in the technical domains that include: military systems of greater lethality with longer ranges, increased cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, hypersonics, direct energy weapons, constellations of satellites, as well as expanding and evolving 'naval aviation, unmanned systems, sensors, communications and [precision guided] weapons'. In this context, new operational concepts and doctrine are needed for land and amphibious forces.⁴⁰



AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY AND THE INDO-PACIFIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT


The most recent 2013 and 2016 Australian DWPs have put the Indo-Pacific and its subregions of maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific at the forefront of Australia's defence policy, however it has not shown enough consideration of the urban-littoral operating environment nor of the role of land power in contributing to joint operations in the Indo-Pacific.

The DWP 2016 makes only three mentions of the word 'urban' – two in relation to terrorism, one of which is specific to the Paris attacks of 2015, and the third in relation to problems of urban development in Sydney in relation to the development of the defence facility at Garden Island. The littoral zone, despite dominating much of the ADF's areas of direct military interest in its key subregion is not mentioned at all. The Indo-Pacific has deep penetration with 72 mentions. The bridge between these geographical concepts is the notion of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime environment, as such the DWP 2016 which used the word 'maritime' 130 times throughout the White Paper.⁴¹

A key point of analysis in the 2016 DWP, like its 2013 predecessor, is an overly heavy focus on naval and air capabilities at the expense of true joint capabilities. This focus as well as calls by some commentators to return to a 'focused force' for the ADF based on denial operations (denying the enemy the use of space, personnel or facilities) in the air-sea gap to Australia's north risks a return to a one-dimensional approach to Australian strategy. This concept, which is familiar to defence planners, risks what J.C. Wylie has called the dangerous notion of the "comfortable and placid acceptance of a single idea, a single exclusive dominate military pattern of thought" for Australia.⁴²

Key sections of the 2016 DWP do outline the development of advanced mobile ground-based air defence systems, long range precision missile systems, joint domain awareness and cyber capabilities as well as the development of a riverine capability to improve littoral operations and amphibious manoeuvres. These capabilities will be essential to support and sustain the Australian Army's ability to operate against diverse adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict in the Indo-Pacific and its urban and littoral hubs.

The question remains as to what extent such systems and capabilities will be funded and developed over the next five to ten years (especially as a number of projects are already delayed); and what level of commitment the ADF (and in particular the Australian Army) will make to developing doctrine, capability and systems to support these moves? In order to sustain these, the new series of strategic guidance papers for the ADF must include a continual focus on the Indo-Pacific region as well as a and a much deeper understanding of the operating environment of this region and its key subregions of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia across the physical, human and technological domains of this geography.



ENDNOTES

- ¹ Nick Bisley (2017), *Integrated Asia: Australia's Dangerous New Strategic Geography*, Centre of Gravity Series (No. 31), Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.
- ² I say this with an ear to history, and especially the period leading up to 1914 which had seen the development of significant level of globalisation.
- ³ Alan Dupont (2003), 'Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia's defence', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 57(1): 55-76
- ⁴ Stephan Fruehling (2014), *Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War*, London: Routledge, p. 177.
- ⁵ Fruehling, op. cit., p. 179-80.
- ⁶ Robert D. Kaplan (2012), *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, New York: Random House.
- ⁷ During the Howard era, while the 2000 *Defence White Paper* remained with its focus on a concentric circles approach to geographical and defence planning, subsequent updates eschewed much of the geographical foundations to defence planning as operations in support of the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved.
- ⁸ Department of Defence (Aust.) (2013), *Defence White Paper 2013*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- ⁹ Department of Defense (US) (2012), *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence*, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
- ¹⁰ It should be noted that President Obama did not use the phrase 'Pivot' during his speech in the Australian Parliament. See the White House (2011), 'Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament', 17 November, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>
- ¹¹ Department of Defense (US) (2014), *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf
- ¹² Peter Dean (2014), 'US puts the Asian 'pivot' into pictures', *East Asia Forum*, 11 April, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/11/us-puts-the-asian-pivot-into-pictures/>
- ¹³ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C. 18 December 2017 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>
- ¹⁴ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States* (This document replaces the previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews) <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>
- ¹⁵ Department of Defence (Aust.), op cit., p. 7.
- ¹⁶ Department of Defence (Aust.) (2013), *Defence White Paper 2013*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, p. 39.
- ¹⁷ Department of Defence (Aust.) (2009), *Defence White Paper 2009*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- ¹⁸ For example see, John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives*, Washington D.C., Brassey, 2002; Archer Jones, *Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach* Praeger, Westport, 1996; Williamson Murray, 'Some Thoughts on War and Geography', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.22(2-3), 1999, p.201-217; Christopher J. Fettweis, 'On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now', *Orbis*, 2015, Vol.59(2), pp.233-248, amongst many others
- ¹⁹ Paul Dibb (2012), 'The Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian Defence Policy and Planning', *Security Challenges*, 8(4): 13-31.
- ²⁰ Meg Keen & Julien Barbara (2015), 'Pacific Urbanisation: Changing Times', *SSGM In Brief* (No. 64), Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National University.
- ²¹ Overall in the Pacific more than 70 percent of the population live in urban areas however this is driven mainly by Australia and New Zealand with urbanisation rates above 85 per cent. See (2013), *Urbanisation trends in Asia and the Pacific*, New York: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).
- ²² Ibid.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Professor Peter J. Dean is a strategic studies scholar who specialises in Australian and United States strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the ANZUS Alliance, Australian strategic policy and military operations. He joined The University of Western Australia as Pro Vice-Chancellor (Education) in 2018. Peter has been a Fulbright Fellow in Australia-United States Alliance Studies, an Endeavour Research Scholar, as well as a non-resident fellow with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Georgetown University in Washington D.C. Before joining UWA, Peter was a scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University where he held numerous research, teaching and leadership positions. Peter is the editor of the Melbourne University Press Defence

Studies series, a member of the Editorial Board of the Australian Army Journal and a former managing editor of the journal Security Challenges. He is a regular media commentator on Australian, United States and regional defence issues.



www.perthusasia.edu.au/peter-dean



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Perth USAsia Centre

PERTH USASIA CENTRE

M265, 3rd Floor, Old Economics Building (Bldg 351)
The University of Western Australia
35 Stirling Highway
Crawley WA 6009
Australia

T. +61 8 6488 4320

F. +61 8 6488 4333

E. perthusasiacentre@uwa.edu.au

W. perthusasia.edu.au



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