



Countering ISIS in Southeast Asia: The case for an ICT offensive

By Fergus Hanson

"We have an ongoing Islamist terror threat and the situation in Syria has the potential to escalate that threat as militarised radicals come back.

I don't say that there is any simple solution to this problem, but the vigilance that's been maintained since 2001 needs to be increased...."

- Prime Minister Tony Abbott¹

Introduction

Southeast Asia has direct experience of returning extremists. Indonesian veterans of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan laid the foundations for a spate of terrorist attacks including the Bali bombings that killed 202 people. The same conflict drove the creation of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines as well as enduring links to Al Qaeda. The rise of ISIS represents the latest chapter in a war against extremism former head of the army, Peter Leahy, has said will likely involve Australia 'for the rest of the century.'² However, ISIS represents a particularly virulent and concerning threat.

First, with its de facto control of significant portions of Iraq and Syria ISIS is a different type of terrorist group. As then-US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel put it: 'They're [ISIS] beyond just a terrorist group. They marry ideology, a sophistication of strategic and tactical military prowess. They are tremendously well-funded.'³

Second, communications technology and low cost travel have created the potential for wider and deeper regional connections than those formed by militants fighting in Afghanistan in the 80s. Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf fighters used links forged in Afghanistan to stay connected (one reason Jemaah Islamiyah fighters find sanctuary with the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines), but returning ISIS fighters could take regional cooperation to new levels. Communications technologies give ISIS recruiters a messaging platform across the region and low cost travel is making transport to the Middle East far easier than it was in the 1980s. This is increasing the number of fighters stemming from the region as well as broadening the range of countries they are coming from. As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict put it, ISIS is creating a potent mix: 'The appeal of ISIS is different, a combination of religious prophecies involving Sham (greater Syria); the string of victories in Iraq in June that gave a sense of backing a winner; the resonance of the concept of the caliphate; and sophisticated use by ISIS of social media.'⁴

¹ Phillip Coorey, 'Syria war graduates bigger threat than 2001 attacks, says Abbott', *Australian Financial Review*, 10 June 2014, http://www.afr.com/p/national/syria_war_graduates_bigger_threat_2hwUer2QZMX4xPtjdusjM

² Brendan Nicholson, 'We'll fight radical Islam for 100 years, says ex-army head Peter Leahy', *The Australian*, 9 August 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/well-fight-radical-islam-for-100-years-says-exarmy-head-peter-leahy/story-e6frg8yo-1227018630297>

³ Chuck Hagel, 'News transcript', US Department of Defence, 21 August 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5491>

⁴ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, p 2, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf

Third, unlike the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a direct participant in the conflict (Australia) is located in the immediate region, making it an enduring focus for returning extremists.

Steps are being taken to shape the military outcome in Iraq and Syria. Increasingly vigorous legal, policing and intelligence efforts are also being made to prevent the departure of more would-be-militants and manage their ongoing presence in the region as well as the return of trained extremists. However, the non-government sector also has much to offer in terms of understanding how ISIS is exploiting technology and communications, and turning these tools against them to discredit its appeal.

This report looks at the scale of the problem, its regional nature, the threat to Australia and the nature of the response so far. It concludes with an integrated, regional proposal to undermine the appeal of ISIS to would-be-militants, and those who are already radicalized using the same tools ISIS is currently exploiting to its own advantage.

The scale of the problem

In September 2014, a CIA source reported the number of foreign fighters in Syria alone at more than 15,000, including 2,000 Westerners. These came from over 80 countries.⁵ In Australia's immediate region four countries are the largest sending states: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Other countries of interest include Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.

The estimates of ISIS fighters originating from Australia and Southeast Asia vary. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has said 150 Australians have been or are currently fighting with extremists in Iraq and Syria,⁶ leading *Time* to dub Australia 'the biggest per capita contributor of foreign jihadists to ISIS'.⁷

In April 2013, the Director General of ASIO, David Irvine, said the numbers of Australians fighting with the rebels in Syria was 'in the hundreds and not the tens'.⁸

The estimated number of ISIS fighters stemming from Indonesia varies from 34 to 300. In August 2014, Ansyad Mbai, the head of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) said he had the names of 34 Indonesian ISIS members. In a September 2014 report, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict stated 'the true figure is probably over a hundred, though estimates in the Australian media of over 300 are almost certainly too high'.⁹

In the Philippines, two militant Islamic groups have pledged their support to ISIS: the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayyaf.¹⁰ A Reuters report from September 2014 discussed the deaths of two Filipino Muslims who died in the Syria conflict in March and noted 'about 100 Filipinos traveled to Iran to undergo military training and were subsequently deployed in Syria' according to the Foreign Ministry.¹¹ This followed a conflicting statement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines the previous month that no Filipinos had been identified training or joining ISIS in Iraq or Syria.¹²

In Malaysia, one report in September 2014 citing a senior Malaysian intelligence official said 40 Malaysians had been recruited, up from 30 reported by the *New Straits Times* in June.¹³

⁵ Jomana Karadsheh, Jim Sciutto and Laura Smith-Spark, 'How foreign fighters are swelling ISIS ranks in startling numbers', *CNN*, 14 September 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/meast/isis-numbers/>

⁶ Latika Bourke, 'Number of Australians fighting with militants in Iraq and Syria 'extraordinary', Julie Bishop says', *ABC*, 19 June 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-19/150-australians-fighting-with-extremists-in-iraq-and-syria/5535018>

⁷ P Nash Jenkins, 'You'll never guess which country is the biggest per capita contributor of foreign jihadists to ISIS', *Time*, 23 June 2014, <http://time.com/2911040/australia-isis-syria-iraq-terrorism/>

⁸ Brendan Nicholson, 'Fears Aussies will turn to terror', *The Australian*, 16 April, 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/fears-aussies-will-turn-to-terror/story-e6frg8yo-1226621106177>

⁹ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf

¹⁰ 'Philippine jihadists pledge support to Islamic State', *RT*, 16 August 2014, <http://rt.com/news/180736-philippine-jihadists-support-isis/>

¹¹ Manuel Mogato, 'Philippines starts inquiry into Filipino militants in Syria', *Reuters*, 13 September 2014, <http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0H804R20140913?irpc=932>

¹² 'AFP: no Filipinos fighting with ISIS', *Philippine Times*, 21 August 2014, <http://www.philippinetimes.com/index.php/sid/224948579>

¹³ 'Malay-speaking Isis fighters come together under new unit, report says', *Malaysian Insider*, 26 September 2014, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says> and Hariz Mohd and Rahmat Khairulrijal, 'More locals joining militant groups', *New Straits Times*, 16 June 2014, <http://www.nst.com.my/node/3181>

Other Southeast Asian countries are also affected by the ISIS threat. In October 2014, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean said:

"...our assessment remains that the expansion of the ISIL threat beyond Syria and Iraq has raised the threat not only to countries who are part of the US coalition but also to Singapore. As with the threat from the Al-Qaeda, even if Singapore is not itself a target, foreign interests here may be targeted."¹⁴

In a June 2014 ISIS video, it was claimed a recruit had even come from Cambodia.¹⁵ Thailand's restive south is another potential source as perhaps is Brunei.

A regional challenge

While there are only a few hundred citizens from across Southeast Asia and Australia fighting with ISIS, as the experience in Indonesia has shown, even a small number of trained and motivated former militants can leave a devastating terrorism legacy.

A national terror network can be difficult enough to combat, but a regionally organized grouping presents even greater challenges. Yet, the appeal of ISIS across the region coupled with new technology to connect extremists is laying the groundwork for this very network.

As the Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister's comments above make clear; in an interconnected region it is not even necessary for militants to be home grown. If a country offers attractive soft targets to strike at Westerners an attack is a possibility.

The network will also extend well beyond the region. Malaysian Defence Forces Chief, General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin, said he was 'worried that when they [militants] return to Malaysia, they will do something that can threaten the safety of the country, especially after they established a network in neighbouring countries from Syria or Iraq'.¹⁶ Another extra-regional dimension emerged in September 2014, when Indonesia arrested four ISIS-linked Uighurs suspected of travelling to Indonesia with the intent of engaging with local groups. They had reportedly travelled through Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia.¹⁷

Technology is already playing an important connecting role among militants. Evidence has emerged of Indonesian and Malaysian militants connecting over Facebook.¹⁸ Facebook is also being used in a range of recruitment initiatives¹⁹ and social networking tools are being used by militants to communicate their activities in Iraq and Syria and to issue calls to action.²⁰

Language is another uniting factor. The generally limited fluency in English or Arabic of Indonesians is tying them naturally to their Malaysian neighbours on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. In August 2014, 22 Indonesians and Malaysians came together in Al-Shadadi, Hasaka province to discuss the desirability of forming a katibah, a military unit of about 100 people, even posting a photo of one meeting on Facebook. According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, which reported the gathering, this 'also made sense given the ISIS agenda to expand the reach of the caliphate to other areas, including Southeast Asia. Members of the katibah could become the vanguard for a fighting force that would reach into Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.'²¹

¹⁴ 'Parliament: Singaporeans planning to support or join ISIS will be dealt with under the law', *Straits Times*, 7 October 2014, <http://www.straitstimes.com/news/singapore/more-singapore-stories/story/parliament-singaporeans-planning-support-or-join-isis-wi#sthash.PWiFnND3.dpuf>

¹⁵ 'Abu Muthanna al-Yemeni from Britain - ISIS 'No life without jihad' video' *LiveLeak*, 12 June 2014, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6a5_1403639105

¹⁶ 'Malay-speaking Isis fighters come together under new unit, report says', *Malaysian Insider*, 26 September 2014, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says>

¹⁷ 'Jakarta nabs 4 foreigners with 'ISIS connection'', *Straits Times*, 15 September 2014, <http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/indonesia/story/jakarta-nabs-4-foreigners-isis-connection-20140915>

¹⁸ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf

¹⁹ Hariz Mohd and Rahmat Khairulrijal, 'More locals joining militant groups', *New Straits Times*, 16 June 2014, <http://www.nst.com.my/node/3181>

²⁰ Lee Shi-lan, 'Malaysian militants for Isis recruited through social media, says source', *Malaysian Insider*, 22 September 2014, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malaysian-militants-for-isis-recruited-through-social-media-says-source>

²¹ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf

Highlighting the connection between technology and regionalisation, in July, an Australian national was arrested in the central Philippines for allegedly using social media to recruit Filipino Muslims to join ISIS.²² Australian and Filipino police jointly conducted the arrest.

Other regional linkages include evidence of Indonesians seeking to join ISIS leaving from Malaysia to throw off surveillance and Malaysians doing the same via Indonesia. There are also links between Malaysian militants and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.²³

Threat to Australia

The threat to Australia comes in many forms.

There is the immediate threat posed by domestic attacks, inspired by ISIS. The most immediate example is the hostage taking by lone gunman Man Haron Monis in December 2014 at a Sydney café that resulted in the deaths of two people as well as Monis himself.

The Monis attack followed a foiled plot to kidnap and behead a random person and a knife attack by a terror suspect called in by police for questioning.²⁴ The October 2014, shooting and car attacks in Canada were in a similar vein: carried out by individuals who had had their passports suspended and were being monitored, but carried out attacks at home instead. Professor Greg Barton of Monash University was reported as saying a 'new type of case management' is needed for those who have been prevented from joining ISIS. 'It shouldn't all just fall back on police and intelligence.'²⁵

Trained former combatants could also increase the scale and deadliness of attacks. As the *Australian Financial Review* reported in June 2014, 'One senior source said the predominant fear was radicals returning home with "skills" honed in Syria's civil war that would enable them to carry out military-style operations similar to the 2008 Mumbai massacre in India in which 166 people were murdered. "They are getting more advanced training, bomb making, combat," he said. "There's a growing sense of concern."²⁶

As previous terror attacks in Indonesia have demonstrated, Australians can also be caught up or targeted in regional attacks. With ISIS, there is a similar risk that returning militants with newfound military skills will increase the deadliness of attacks abroad. As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict observed:

"Support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) in Indonesia raises the risk of violence there even though the capacity of violent extremist groups remains low. This could change with the eventual return home of Indonesians now fighting in Syria and Iraq who will have the training, combat experience, and leadership potential now lacking in Indonesia's extremist community.

The 22 September 2014 exhortation by IS spokesman Al-Adnani to kill foreigners linked to the U.S.-led coalition could also provide an incentive to Indonesian ISIS supporters to target Westerners as a way of earning approval from leaders of the self-declared caliphate."²⁷

understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf

²² 'Philippines arrests Australian over ties to militant group ISIL', *Reuters*, 12 July 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/12/uk-syria-crisis-philippines-idUKKBN0FG0PF20140712>.

²³ 'Malaysia detains 14 suspected Muslim militants', *AP*, 15 October 2014, <http://news.yahoo.com/malaysia-detains-13-suspected-muslim-militants-061811200.html> and 'Malay-speaking Isis fighters come together under new unit, report says', *Malaysian Insider*, 26 September 2014, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says>.

²⁴ Rob Taylor, 'Australia foils alleged beheading plot linked to Islamic State', *Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/australia-detains-suspects-in-terrorism-probe-1411008044> and 'Terror suspect killed after stabbing police', *Sky News*, 24 September 2014, <http://www.skynews.com.au/news/top-stories/2014/09/24/terror-suspect-killed-after-police-stabbed.html>.

²⁵ Tom Allard, 'Canadian shooting an example of Australian security agencies' worst nightmare', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 October 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/canadian-shooting-an-example-of-australian-security-agencies-worst-nightmare-20141023-11asc9.html#ixzz3GxjyFGfw>.

²⁶ Phillip Coorey, 'Australia, Indonesia to share intel on Syria', *AFR*, 7 June 2014, http://www.afr.com/p/national/australia_indonesia_to_share_intel_5WA13BCRQtoTp3fS1RoU0K.

²⁷ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia', IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, p 1, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.

Another risk comes from new regional networks developing with a common ideology and ambition. The vision of a caliphate promulgated by ISIS and its apparent attractiveness to small groups of extremists across the region, offers the potential for a new broader rallying point. The ease of connecting otherwise geographically isolated groups through technology could further promote this. Technology could also play an important role in recruitment and radicalisation around regionally focused objectives.

There are limits to this, with language barriers the strongest. Cultural and nationalist tensions are also likely to be inhibitors to collaboration. There are further questions around how long a regional viewpoint can last, once ISIS begins to flag in Iraq and Syria.

While the scale of threat needs to be kept in proportion, there is clearly a need for sustained, long term vigilance.

The response

The most visible efforts from regional states to counter the ISIS threat are in the areas of law, policing and intelligence.

In September 2014, Australia conducted its biggest ever anti-terrorism raids involving 800 police, in response to a plot linked to ISIS.²⁸ Additional raids followed in December 2014.²⁹ It has also canceled passports of citizens seeking to join the fight and of those trying to return to Australia.³⁰ In 2013-14, it issued adverse security assessments in relation to 45 passports, up from 18 the previous year.³¹ Malaysian and Indonesian police have also made a string of arrests.³²

At a regional level cooperation is already beginning to occur, as the abovementioned arrest of the Australian national in the Philippines attests. Australia and Indonesia have also discussed intelligence sharing arrangements in relation to ISIS fighters.³³

The legal framework for countering the threat is still a work in progress in all countries and is complicated by the multifaceted and evolving nature of the threat. It needs to cover recruitment and incitement, the departure of would-be fighters and the suspension of their passports. The transit of militant non-nationals through a country's territory, returned fighters who have fought overseas, communications by militants from prisons to list only a selection.

Even in the most developed jurisdiction in the region, Australia, a raft of new anti-terror laws targeting ISIS fighters has only recently been passed with more to follow.³⁴ In Indonesia, a special security meeting declared ISIS contrary to Pancasila, the founding philosophy of the state and an all-of-government effort to counter it in Indonesia, but as the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict observed 'It was not clear what law would be used.' In September the President issued a seven-point instruction for countering ISIS, but left it to his successor to try and pass a new bill through parliament.³⁵

While these government led efforts are critical, what is missing is a coordinated regional effort to counter the tool ISIS is currently exploiting most effectively: communications technology.

²⁸ 'Authorities thwart 'beheading' plot in Australia's biggest ever counter-terrorism raids', *ABC*, 18 September 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-18/authorities-thwart-beheading-plot-in-australias-biggest-raid/5754276>.

²⁹ Dan Box, 'Police launch new terror raids', *The Australian*, 19 December 2014.

³⁰ Lisa Cox, 'Passports of Australian jihadists cancelled, says Julie Bishop', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 June 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/passports-of-australian-jihadists-cancelled-says-julie-bishop-20140622-3aly1.html#ixzz3GN0apo78>.

³¹ 'ASIO report to parliament 2013-2014', ASIO, p xiii, http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/2013-14-Report_to_Parliament.pdf.

³² 'Malay-speaking Isis fighters come together under new unit, report says', *Malaysian Insider*, 26 September 2014, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says> and Maeswara Palupi, 'Indonesia exposing ISIS ties with local terror groups', *Khabar*, 3 September 2014, http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2014/09/03/feature-02 and 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, pp 18-19, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.

³³ Phillip Coorey, 'Australia, Indonesia to share intel on Syria', *AFR*, 7 June 2014, http://www.afr.com/p/national/australia_indonesia_to_share_intel_5WA13BCRQtoTp3fS1RoU0K.

³⁴ David Wroe, 'Pass terrorism laws quickly, expert says', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 October 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/pass-terrorism-laws-quickly-expert-says-20141016-1177go.html> and 'Counter-terror laws pass through Parliament with bipartisan support', *PM*, 1 October 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2014/s4098537.htm>.

³⁵ 'The evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,' IPAC Report 13, *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, pp 20-21, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.

Fighting fire with fire

'What we are seeing every day, is new exhortations on the internet urging fanatics to murder everyone and anyone who acts or thinks differently from them'.³⁶

-Prime Minister Tony Abbott

ISIS has shown a new level of sophistication in its harnessing of communications technology to recruit fighters and organize them internationally. There is an urgent need for a regional response that uses the same tools to discredit the ISIS message and that complements existing government led efforts. Below is a proposal for an integrated response that targets would-be recruits, those who have been prevented from traveling to Iraq and Syria as well as returning militants.

Understanding and monitoring the evolving ways technology is being harnessed by ISIS is critical to countering the threat it poses. Technology is facilitating ISIS recruitment and organizing and will likely play a pivotal connecting role as militants begin returning.

The non-government sector, particularly the technology industry, could be harnessed to blunt the effectiveness of ISIS's use of technology, perhaps mobilised around a government-sponsored hub for counter-radical communications. This would provide new and alternative sources of analysis to government on evolving trends and identify ways technology can be harnessed to counter the threat.

These efforts could include identification of opportunities to undermine ISIS online and testing techniques to counter radical online communications. These could draw on existing efforts by the Digital Outreach Team located within the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at the US State Department that has been working on these issues since 2006 as well as various military units working on counter radicalization online.³⁷

Communications are clearly central to recruiting ISIS fighters in the first place and will play a role in mobilising radicals once they return.

An empirically driven online and offline communications response that seeks to discredit the appeal of ISIS propaganda among vulnerable populations in Australia and Southeast Asia will be key to countering the threat.

This could take several forms and would need to draw heavily on private sector expertise, including survey and public relations firms. Nationally representative opinion polling could be used to identify vulnerable communities in the four largest source states: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. For example, a 2012 Lowy Institute Poll in Indonesia found 12% of Indonesians are in favour of the Indonesian government 'encouraging militant groups to attack Australia'. And of this 12% holding an extremist viewpoint, 71% are under 40 and come from West Java or neighbouring Banten Province (63%), with most (58%) saying they speak Sundanese at home.³⁸ This sort of polling allows for a clear targeting of campaigns among the most vulnerable populations.

Focused polling could be used to test the efficacy of various messages in blunting the appeal of ISIS propaganda. Successful messages could then be rolled out using a variety of online and offline channels targeting the key population groups. With follow-up polling used to measure their effectiveness and the opportunity for scaling.

Cultural and religious sensitivities in the region place limitations on Australian leadership, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Australia's understated and softly spoken cooperation with Indonesia in the wake of the Bali bombings is a good example of how to do it well. Efforts to counter ISIS's use of communications technologies should follow this low-key and cooperative model. Compared to military intervention, a low key online and offline communications offensive would be a small cost, but key to mitigating the threat posed by this small group of extremists across the region.

³⁶ Tony Abbott, cited in 'John Kerin, 'Aussie jihadist believed killed', *Australian Financial Review*, 30 October 2014.

³⁷ Fergus Hanson, 'Revolution @State: the spread of ediplomacy', *Lowy Institute*, March 2012, p 18.

³⁸ Fergus Hanson, 'Lowy Institute Indonesia poll 2012: shattering stereotypes', *Lowy Institute*, 2012, p 11,



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